On May 2, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution determined that the Alternative for Germany (AfD) warrants classification as a far-right, extremist party. In response, US President Donald Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, defended the AfD and condemned the decision as an act of "tyranny in disguise."

As with US Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February and Elon Musk’s vocal support for the European extreme right on numerous occasions, such attacks confirm that the United States is no longer Europe’s ally, but has become its adversary. Not only has Trump signaled his willingness to abandon Ukraine to Russia; he is openly seeking to destroy Europe’s social, ecological, economic, and democratic model.

Trump’s goal is to build an authoritarian, illiberal world order.

He wants to dismantle his own country’s democratic state; establish transactional alliances with the world’s major illiberal regimes; and create an impregnable North American fortress by establishing US sovereignty over Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal. He even refuses to rule out the use of force to get his way.

He sees no problem with Ukraine falling into Russia’s orbit because he welcomes a return to a world in which great powers preside over "spheres of interest." Each of these objectives poses geopolitical, economic, and security challenges to Europe.

Some Europeans are clinging to the hope that this breakdown of transatlantic relations will be temporary, and that the 2026 midterms or the 2028 presidential election will set things right. But for Europe to base its strategy on such an idea would be very risky.

Any timidity in Europe’s response to Trump’s aggression will only embolden him. Like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump believes only in power struggles and that "might makes right."

Moreover, Trump’s capacity to tilt the US durably toward autocracy – the exact opposite of European values – is greater than many previously thought. In fact, we are witnessing a rapid "Putinization" of American politics.

The Trump administration’s anti-European stance has not emerged from thin air. As it looks toward Asia, the US has long sought to disengage from Europe.

This was apparent in President Barack Obama’s decision not to push back firmly against Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, or to enforce his own "red line" when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used poison gas on his citizens.

While US support for Ukraine during President Joe Biden’s administration acted as a brake on this trend, it fell short of what the situation required. And it was clear that the disengagement from Europe would continue after him. Well before Trump’s re-election last November, I had already concluded that Biden would probably be the last truly transatlantic US president.

For many Americans, NATO increasingly looks like a holdover from a bygone era.

What can Europe do?

First, we must respond forcefully to Trump’s trade war, and not give in to his extortion concerning our regulation of Big Tech. We are indeed dangerously dependent on the US for digital technology. That needs to change: we will have to pursue the same kind of derisking as we are doing vis-à-vis China. But America depends on Europe, too.

The European Union still accounts for one-fifth of global consumption, and it becomes even more important to US companies confronting diminished access to the Chinese market.f

Second, Europe must pursue steadily strategic sovereignty in defense and high technology.

There is no shortage of reports detailing what needs to be done. Such investments will require significant resources, and thus new issuances of pan-European debt. (Unlike the NextGenerationEU fund, debt repayment must be ensured with new EU-wide resources.)

Third, we must reach out to other likeminded countries that have been subjected to Trump’s aggression: Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia.

Mark Carney and Anthony Albanese’s victories in Canada and Australia, respectively, show that the West will not simply roll over for the new illiberalism.

We should create a G6 – a G7 without the US – and build a fully European defense architecture that includes countries like the United Kingdom and Norway.

Fourth, we should reach out to the Global South, both to ease the pressure from Trump and Putin and to preserve multilateralism.

But doing so will require significant changes. We will need to move away from "Fortress Europe" migration policies and the permissiveness shown toward Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s far-right government. Tolerating the intolerable in Gaza has stripped us of most of our moral authority.

Is declaring Europe’s independence from America realistic?

After eight decades as close allies, Europeans are understandably struggling to get used to a US president who acts like a Russian dictator. The changes that we must make will inevitably encounter resistance in some EU countries that are politically aligned with Trumpism.

This is also a challenge for the European Commission, which has in recent years consistently, and somewhat carelessly, tended to align itself with the US on everything.

Fortunately, recent statements by Friedrich Merz, the likely German chancellor, suggest that one of Europe’s most traditionally Atlanticist countries understands the new challenge we face.

The European People’s Party and its national member parties must also finally stop cozying up to far-right populists who are fully aligned with Trump and Putin.

Europe’s center-right parties should return to their traditional alliances with Social Democrats, liberals, and Greens to stand up together against Trump.

Achieving Europe’s independence from the US will not be easy. But if we do not act now, and decisively, the future of our social and democratic model could be bleak.

This article originally appeared on Project Syndicate and is republished with permission from the copyright holder.