Orbán sidelines Ukraine, helps Moldova. What might happen to Kyiv's EU dream with Hungary's veto
In March 2022, Moldova applied for EU membership, following Ukraine and Georgia. They formed a "trio" of states, and this was no coincidence.
Ukraine had taken this step immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion, and Moldova could have joined in then as well. European Pravda sources say President Maia Sandu opposed the move, believing it would anger both the Kremlin and Brussels. But when Georgia also submitted its EU application, Sandu realised that her caution could result in Moldova being left on the sidelines of history, and she followed suit.
A lot has changed in the past three years.
Moldova could now overtake Ukraine on the path to EU membership. The EU is preparing to launch accession negotiations with Chișinău in the second half of 2025 – but not with Kyiv.
This would break the informal "package deal" for EU enlargement. Kyiv hopes that Ukraine’s friends in the EU will not let this happen.
But European Pravda sources in Brussels and other capitals admit that Moldova is certain to get the green light with or without Ukraine – otherwise a pro-Russian comeback in that country’s elections will be inevitable.
Meanwhile, Ukraine remains blocked by Hungary’s veto.
Kyiv has two options: either persuade Viktor Orbán to lift the veto, or wait for a change of government in Hungary.
"Candidate packages": what they are and why they matter
Two weeks ago, European Pravda broke the news that Brussels was preparing to separate Ukraine and Moldova on their path towards EU membership.
New member states usually join the EU in groups, as this helps to streamline bureaucratic processes. In seven waves of enlargement, only twice has a country joined the Union singly – Greece in 1981 and Croatia in 2013. In both cases, the EU had no other candidates at a similar level of readiness. The Croatian example is especially striking, and we’ll return to it later.
Now there is a further argument in favour of "package deals": geopolitics.
At a time when the EU has little appetite for enlargement, bundling candidate countries together helps build coalitions in their favour.
Moldova has a strong advocate within the EU – Romania, with which it has historical ties.
Ukraine, for its part, enjoys the backing of Poland, the Baltic states and others.
Moreover, Ukraine and Moldova are at a similar stage of EU integration and face similar challenges, meaning the package approach is beneficial to all. But this package is being torn apart under pressure from Hungary.
The Hungarian government has vetoed the opening of accession talks with Ukraine and is openly advocating for Moldova and Ukraine to be treated separately in the EU accession process.
"The European Union is doing everything possible to persuade Hungary to stop blocking accession negotiations with Ukraine," one diplomat told European Pravda on condition of anonymity. "We are exerting pressure. But if this continues, the opening of negotiations on Cluster 1, 'Fundamentals', for Moldova may be scheduled for the autumn of 2025."
Several other sources have confirmed that the EU is in no rush and will try to break the Hungarian veto by the end of summer.
But after that, it will most likely have to compromise.
The Ukrainian sources who spoke to EP were more optimistic in their assessments. One source noted that Kyiv was aware of such discussions among member states several months ago and said Kyiv had "managed to stop it".
But that was in the past. Time is ticking away, and there are no signs that Orbán is preparing to lift the veto. That’s why talk of "breaking up the package" has resumed in Brussels – this time publicly.
After European Pravda reported on this, EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos acknowledged in an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that decoupling Ukraine and Moldova on the membership path is a real possibility.
"We are already discussing with the member states what to do because no member state is against starting to open the first cluster [of accession chapters] with Moldova," she said.
Kos’s statement has not received universal support in Brussels. Many, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, believe that the time for public statements has not yet come. As a result, the European Commission distanced itself from the initiative and shifted responsibility to the member states.
Nevertheless, it did not deny that the idea is under discussion.
A blow to Ukraine, a boost for Moldova
Why did the EU give in to Orbán’s pressure? The reason lies in the decisive parliamentary elections in Moldova, scheduled for 28 September 2025.
Maia Sandu and her ruling PAS party (Party of Action and Solidarity) have made European integration the cornerstone of their campaign. Sandu, who was previously cautious, now insists that Moldova will join the EU by 2029 if pro-European forces (i.e. her party) win the elections. But convincing voters of this is impossible unless the government can show tangible progress on the European path.
"European officials tell us they need to help Sandu – that her situation is very bad, and unless accession negotiations start, she will lose," a source in the Ukrainian government told European Pravda.
Indeed, Moldova’s pro-Western leadership has little else to show as a success.
The economy is in poor shape. The International Monetary Fund has downgraded Moldova’s 2025 GDP growth forecast from 3.7% to 0.6%. High inflation is expected due to a gas standoff with Russia earlier this year.
Sandu’s team can claim energy independence from Russia as an achievement, but for voters, that remains an abstract concept.
If, on top of economic hardships, Chișinău is seen as a hostage of Hungary’s veto on the EU path, it could doom Sandu’s party and open the door to a pro-Russian pivot. Such a development would harm Ukraine strategically, officials in Brussels emphasise.
Formally, the Ukrainian government has no say in EU enlargement decisions, but Kyiv has made no secret of its dissatisfaction.
All the Ukrainian sources who spoke to European Pravda stressed that the EU must not forget Ukraine’s importance.
"A green light for Moldova makes the EU’s stance unprecedentedly lenient. And the European Commission is essentially admitting its inability to influence Orbán," said one source involved in the negotiation process.
What Ukraine can do
Negotiations with Moldova can only begin if all EU member states, including Poland and the Baltic countries, vote in favour of decoupling the pair. This gives Ukrainian diplomats some hope.
"We're hearing from the Baltics that they oppose the separation. We’re counting on them to block any such decision," one source familiar with the negotiations assured European Pravda.
But the reality for Kyiv is discouraging. Even Ukraine’s biggest supporters appear ready to side with Moldova.
"We're in a difficult position," an enlargement official from one of the Baltic states said, speaking anonymously to European Pravda. "Yes, we support Ukraine and we know it would prefer to preserve the current package. But we also support and help Moldova."
"We won’t veto the start of talks with Moldova," the official admitted. Similar positions are held by all the countries Kyiv relies on.
Several officials from Ukraine-friendly states told European Pravda they are preparing to ramp up pressure on Hungary, aiming to persuade Viktor Orbán at the upcoming EU summit on 26-27 June.
Until then, the issue remains in limbo. Hungary is currently holding "national consultations" with the public on Ukraine’s EU accession, which will last until 20 June. Orbán will not make any decisions until the consultations are over.
"We’re all waiting for the end of June… when Hungary’s consultations wrap up," emphasised one European diplomat.
To put psychological pressure on Orbán, the European Commission has launched a legal review to explore ways to suspend Hungary’s voting rights.
There’s also hope that Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, may shift the dynamic. But none of this guarantees success.
The core problem is that Orbán has chosen Ukraine as an issue in his election campaign.
Hungary's April 2026 parliamentary elections are unique. Orbán is facing a serious risk of defeat for the first time since 2010.
In an effort to rally his supporter base, Orbán is pushing the narrative of a "deadly threat to Hungary" if Ukraine joins the EU. Attacking Ukraine has become part of his struggle for political survival.
But there is one person who may be able to change Orbán’s position: Donald Trump.
For Viktor Orbán, a close relationship with Trump is a core part of his image, for both his electorate and fellow EU politicians.
If Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other European leaders can personally convince Trump that unblocking Ukraine’s path to EU membership is part of the US’s contribution to peace, it could make a difference.
It's a difficult task, but not impossible.
Trump has already named Ukraine’s EU accession as part of his peace plan. This means that Orbán’s actions are undermining Trump’s plan!
And if Trump directly tells the Hungarian PM to end the obstruction and lift the veto at the NATO summit in The Hague on 24-25 June, that could be pivotal.
There is in fact a precedent for this: Orbán used the Ukraine issue to advance his American policy goals back in 2018.
Today’s context is different, but US influence over Orbán could once again be a game-changer.
Failure is also possible
It’s important to note that until the end of June, when Poland’s presidency of the EU Council comes to an end, Hungary is guaranteed to block the start of negotiations with Ukraine. Ukraine has become a hostage to internal European rivalries.
The current Polish government is Orbán’s key opponent in Europe. He’s hoping for snap elections in Poland and a comeback by his allies in the PiS (Law and Justice) party, so he’ll do everything he can to undermine the current Polish leadership.
Since Warsaw has made accession talks for Ukraine a priority of its presidency, Orbán is not going to allow Prime Minister Donald Tusk that political win.
The most optimistic scenario is that Ukraine’s EU membership process is unblocked in July, when Denmark takes over the EU presidency.
But unless something extraordinary happens – such as an intervention by Donald Trump – Hungary’s vetoing will likely continue.
In that case, the EU will switch to Plan B: announcing an intergovernmental EU-Moldova conference, effectively launching Moldova’s accession talks. This is expected to take place in September, just a few weeks before Moldova’s national elections.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s EU path will remain frozen.
"The European Commission is basically ready to wait for Hungary’s elections, which won’t happen until next year. That’s unacceptable to us, but what can we do about it? That’s the question," a senior Ukrainian government official told European Pravda.
Officials within the EU are starting to prepare Ukraine for this reality.
"Yes, it’s true that Ukraine’s formal accession talks might be delayed until Hungary lifts its objections. But it’s important not to overstate the significance of Moldova going first," said Dainius Žalimas, an MEP from Lithuania. "In the 1990s, Lithuania was the last Baltic country to start negotiations with the EU, but ultimately all the Baltics joined at the same time."
EU history also offers some discouraging scenarios.
We’ve already mentioned Croatia, which joined the EU alone in 2013. At the start of its journey in 2005, it was partnered with Macedonia, which was granted candidate status around the same time. But Macedonia was soon hit with a Greek veto, which came with unacceptable demands.
That deadlock took 14 years to escape. The Macedonians had to change their constitution and even the name of their country, which is now North Macedonia. That temporarily unblocked their path, only for another neighbour, Bulgaria, to impose further demands.
As a result, North Macedonia has yet to open a single negotiating chapter, and its people have lost faith that it will ever join the EU.
Meanwhile Croatia, which started at the same time, has been an EU member state since 2013.
There is no guaranteed path for Ukraine to avoid this kind of danger, but avoiding it must be a priority at all costs.
Sergiy Sydorenko, Tetiana Vysotska, Yurii Panchenko,
European Pravda